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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Nathan Sheets
By Yasemin Esmen and Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Between 2007 and 2011, Nathan Sheets was director of the Division of International Finance
at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. He oversaw the operations of the
division and advised the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on economic and financial
developments in foreign countries. Sheets also regularly represented the Federal Reserve Board
at international meetings and in its contacts with foreign central banks. Under his helm, the
division was involved in helping establish and manage the US dollar liquidity swap lines with
foreign central banks. This Lessons Learned abstract is based on an interview with Sheets on
December 11, 2019; the full transcript may be accessed here.
The world’s financial system is interconnected. Strong collaboration among US
institutions, foreign central banks, and international organizations is key to managing
a crisis.
The crisis began in the US financial system, and its effects slowly migrated to other countries,
but at first it was viewed as a US problem. Sheets recalled: “When the crisis first erupted,
particularly in Europe, it was viewed as a US crisis with some spillovers into the European
markets.” However, in late 2007, he pointed out, building tensions, spikes in the Libor-OIS
spread, and volatility in the fed funds rate were clear signs that the effects had already spread
widely, and that global financial markets were desperate for US dollar liquidity. The swap
lines and some other tools were necessary to get funds where they were most needed.
At first, Sheets recalled, the European Central Bank (ECB) adopted a laid-back position with
respect to the swap line (the first the Fed implemented)—“Originally, the European Central
Bank wanted the swap lines structured in a way that made it seem like the ECB was only
passively acting as an agent for the Federal Reserve in Europe.” However, after the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, there was no question that the impact would be
widespread. There were “enormous global spillovers, [and] there was a broader realization
that there would be adverse spillovers to other parts of the world, and that other parts of the
world had similar kinds of underlying problems in their financial system.”
At that point, Sheets explained, “the ECB really became a partner with the Federal Reserve
in fighting the crisis,” and, in general, the cooperation between the major economies
increased:
It was a little bit uneven and it was a little bit choppy in terms of the global ownership
of the crisis and, to some extent, even the global coordination during that first year.
However, once you hit that Lehman inflection point, all central banks were 100% in
and full partners in fighting the crisis. It was a realization that, yes, maybe there were
certain US-oriented features to this, but it was transmitting and escalating around the
world because regulatory policies in essentially all of the major economies, at least in
advanced economy jurisdictions, had fallen short.
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Sheets spoke highly of the extraordinary steps taken by the major countries; the multifaceted
coordinated actions eventually stemmed the tide:
From the swap lines that were introduced in December of 2007 all the way through
to the uncapping of swap lines,1 from the associated policies that were put in place
after the Lehman collapse, to the G-7 declaration, where the G7 countries essentially
jointly guaranteed the liabilities of their banking systems, which was an
extraordinary intervention, none of these interventions had an immediate conclusive
effect on the stresses that were being felt and that characterized the financial crisis.
However, all of those things put together laid the foundation for an improvement of
conditions which we finally saw in the first half of 2009. . .
According to Sheets, the swaps and other actions were well received by the markets: “The
market seemed in particular to take heart from the message that the major central banks
were aware of the challenges and were working closely together to address the stresses. That
was received and was appreciated by market participants.”
The structure and price of central bank swap lines can protect the lending central
bank and mitigate against moral hazard while effectively providing its currency to
financial institutios in other countries.
Sheets recalled that, although the Fed had taken some early steps in 2007 to ease funding
conditions and increase liquidity, “it was not clear that this liquidity was getting to the
European institutions that were hungry for it as directly as it might.” Building tensions;
spikes in the Libor-OIS spread, which was an indication of tightness in funding markets; and
volatility in the fed funds rate were clear signs that the global financial market was desperate
for liquidity, and this led to consideration of the swap lines.
Sheets noted that there was robust discussion in FOMC meetings about the need for the swap
lines, whether they would encourage moral hazard, and their risk to the Fed. The FOMC
concerns regarding risk and moral hazard were addressed in the structure and price of the
lines. The Fed lent to the central bank, not to individual banks in the foreign jurisdiction,
explained Sheets: The foreign central bank would then use “its regulatory, supervisory, and
other tools to evaluate the credit worthiness of the institutions [in its jurisdiction] that were
applying [for loans].” According to Sheets, this structure allowed the Fed to rely on the
foreign central banks and their knowledge of their domestic banks while limiting its risk. The
Fed was not a party to the loan to the domestic commercial banks, Sheets noted:

In total, during the crisis, the Fed established swap agreements with 14 countries of various sizes. Shortly
after the Lehman Brothers, the Fed uncapped its swap lines with five major central banks: the Bank of Canada,
the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the ECB, and the Swiss National Bank, committing to provide any
amount of US dollars that the central banks requested, secured by an equivalent amount of their domestic
currency. The swap lines were the most heavily used of all the Fed’s crisis facilities and reached a peak
outstanding amount in October 2008 of more than $580 billion. A Bank for International Settlements study
considered the Fed swap lines to be “very effective in relieving US dollar liquidity stresses and stresses in
foreign exchange markets.” Central bank co-operation and international liquidity in the financial crisis of 2008–
9 (BIS: May 2010). https://www.bis.org/publ/work310.pdf
1
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That feature of the structure of the lines was also seen, very importantly, as protecting
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, because the Federal Reserve had exposure to a
major foreign central bank, not to any individual institution. If, indeed, some
institution had failed, the foreign central bank would have had an exposure to deal
with, but that foreign central bank would still have been responsible for unwinding
the swap with the Federal Reserve.
Another important factor of concern to the FOMC was moral hazard, which was addressed
through the pricing, Sheets said:
The moral hazard concerns were partially attenuated by the pricing of the liquidity.
It was priced above what the liquidity would have cost during normal times, and
indeed, as the crisis ended, the rate on the swap line was reduced. So, there was
pricing to help with the moral hazard.
The combination of these features, explained Sheets, helped protect the Fed and prompted
appropriate, but not abusive, use of the lines.
We need to learn the lessons from the last crisis to be better equipped to deal with the
next one.
Sheets identified several lessons that he viewed as critical for making sure that the world’s
regulators are prepared for the next crisis.
First: Be more curious in an aggressive and thorough manner. Dig deeper than usual. “We
must ask what is going on and why, what the underlying drivers are, and not just assume
that the markets are allocating optimally.”
Second: Strengthen regulation. We need to make sure banks are sufficiently capitalized to
maintain a strong regulatory system. And “as we strengthen regulation, [we need] to also
make sure that the support for regulation does not get meaningfully watered down―because
that tends to be a bit like a swinging pendulum over time.”
Third: Develop a familiarity with history, an awareness of what went wrong during the crisis
and of how we addressed it. Almost inevitably, shocks are going to happen. “It is really
important that the next round of policymakers be aware of, and conversant with, what we
did and why, and where they think we got it right and where they think we could have done
better.”
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